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FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3317
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0067
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0037
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0094
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0145
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0018
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1502
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY 1099

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [UNMIK](#) [UN](#) [YI](#) [EU](#) [DA](#)
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DENMARK SIGNALS FIRM SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI

REF: STATE 37835

Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, reasons 1.4b,d

11. (C) Ambassador and visiting EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried reviewed our approach on Kosovo March 22 with Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller and MFA State Secretary Ulrik Federspiel. In that exchange, Moeller reported that he had just traveled to the region in support of the Ahtisaari plan and noted his concern about a possible Russian veto in the UN Security Council. The Danish FM underscored the importance of a Security Council resolution, in order to allow the European Union to shoulder tasks there.

12. (C) Reviewing reftel points March 27 with Danish MFA Head of Department for Russia and the Balkans (A/S-equivalent) Mette Kjuel Nielsen, we reinforced this message about the need to maintain unity as Ahtisaari reports his recommendations to the Security Council. Nielsen observed that Danish views are "exactly in line" with the U.S. position outlined in reftel, highlighting our message about Serbia's current leadership (not to blame for the situation, but with a responsibility for their country's legacy) as one that FM Moeller himself emphasized in his recent meetings with Serbian officials.

13. (C) Nielsen, who accompanied Moeller this month to Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, reported that the Serbs seemed resigned to losing Kosovo, but of course unwilling to say so openly. Kostunica may be a lost cause, she said, but others appear to recognize reality -- even if no one is yet willing to break ranks and risk being branded a traitor. Nielsen applauded Serbian officials for, at least, not boycotting the Ahtisaari process; their participation in the Vienna meetings strengthened the legitimacy of the process, if nothing else.

14. (C) Nielsen allowed that she was more optimistic than her minister about the Russians, maintaining that she did not believe Moscow would exercise its veto on Kosovo. The Russians do not stand to gain from such a move, she said, arguing that Putin is not interested in frozen conflicts beyond their usefulness in destabilizing neighbors. Nielsen agreed that a good approach to the Russians is to put the onus on them to come up with what they would like to see in a resolution. Otherwise, the Russians will simply pocket whatever concessions or accommodation we prepare in advance.

15. (C) Acknowledging that talk of going forward without a resolution may be tactically wise, Nielsen nevertheless maintained that Denmark views Security Council action as essential. Some, foremost the British, have argued

previously that Chapter VII authority could be obtained without explicit reference to it in the resolution, but Nielsen thought that that would be difficult to sell.

16. (C) Nielsen reported that German FM Steinmeier is expected to make a big push for unity on the Kosovo issue at the upcoming Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers, and pledged that Denmark will lend its voice in support of that message. The Greeks and Cypriots continue to prove somewhat troublesome, she said, but the Slovaks appear to be "back in the box," and Solana can be expected to keep Spain in line on this issue.

CAIN